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It has long been the policy to make 
cheaply available to firms of all sizes the 
privilege of trading as limited liability 
companies in order to stimulate business 
activity and the economy in general. As 
the recent Strategic Framework 
Document of the DTI's review of 
company law (Modem Company Law Jor a 
Competitive Economy) puts it, there is a 
presumption in our company law against 
'interventionist legislation and in favour 
of facilitating markets'. This desire to 
minimise the burden on companies of 
start-up and continuing regulatory costs 
means that the onus then falls on 
achieving an adequate official response 
when individual directors abuse the 
privilege of limited liability An energetic 
policy of disqualifying unfit directors of 
insolvent companies is thus now 
presented as being at the centre of 
regulatory policy for the protection of 
creditors and the commercial public 
from those who abuse the privilege of 
limited liability.
The Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 requires liquidators, etc., to report 
on the conduct of directors of companies 
that have pone into formal insolvency
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proceedings. It is then for the Insolvency- 
Service, where it is of the view that the 
conduct of the person makes them unfit 
to be a director, to prepare an application 
to the court for an order under s. 6 that 
they be disqualified for between two and 
fifteen years from being a director or 
taking part in the management of limited 
companies. Thus, while entrepreneurs do 
not require a qualification to set up 
limited companies and to become
directors of them, they may subsequently 
be 'disqualified' from taking part in their 
management.
In the early years of the legislation the 
number of s. 6 disqualification orders 
was modest but following a critical 
National Audit Office report in 1993 the 
pace has quickened. Since then the 
number of disqualifications has 
multiplied several times and is currently 
well in excess of 1,000 disqualifications a 
year. A recent Parliamentary answer 
revealed that the expenditure of the 
Insolvency Service in 1997 98 
attributable to the disqualification of 
directors was £22,013,000. The 
Insolvency Service in effect runs at a 
surplus, if totals of fees received and 
interest earned on creditors' funds are 
regarded as its income. Its expenditure 
on disqualification can therefore be said 
to be financed by the creditors of 
insolvent companies. Government 
ministers have repeatedly tried to assure 
the public of their determination to use 
the law on director disqualification to 
purge the business world of directors 
who have shown themselves to be unfit to 
be involved in the management of 
companies. However, whether this 
represents an efficient use of such 
substantial public resources depends 
upon whether disqualification is effective 
as a regulatory device.
This article summarises some of the 
main conclusions of my research into the 
effectiveness of director disqualification, 
which was recently published as a ISO- 
page monograph under the title Director 
Disqualification; No Hiding Place for the 
Unfit? (ACCA Research Report No. 59). 
The report examines the legal rules and 
procedures which are contained in the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
and, bv reference to the extensive body of 
case law which has accumulated over the 
years, considers the extent to which the 
legislation is achieving, or is capable of 
achieving, its apparent objectives. 
Surveys carried out of insolvency 
practitioners and disqualified directors 
contribute a basis of empirical data from
which conclusions are drawn as to how 
the legislation is perceived by those with 
direct experience of its operation. Finally, 
comparison is made between the UK 
rules and those which apply in other 
jurisdictions. In the light of all the 
information collected, the report assesses 
the overall effectiveness of the law on 
disqualification and suggests a number of 
major reforms. The following summary 
outlines the principal factual, legal and 
practical conclusions of the report.
BACKGROUND
The vast majority of limited companies 
in the UK are owner-managed small 
businesses. The advantage of setting up in 
business as a limited cbmpany is that, in 
the absence of personal guarantees, the 
directors/shareholders will not be 
personally responsible for the debts of 
the company. On the one hand, this 
principle acts as a legitimate stimulus to 
entrepreneurial activity as it protects 
business people from their honest 
commercial mistakes and failures. On the 
other hand, it holds the potential for 
abuse by unfit directors. Thus creditors 
may suffer prejudice through the 
directors' long-term improper practice 
and failure to minimise losses in the run- 
up to closure. They suffer when directors 
dishonestly or improperly misuse 
company assets and its interest, and when 
they fail to comply with legal obligations 
such as disclosure of accounts and 
liquidation formalities. The 
disqualification legislation focuses on 
such abuse by directors rather than on 
general incompetence. The broad 
objectives of the legislation are protecting 
the public interest by removing unfit 
individuals from the management of 
companies, deterring improper conduct 
and establishing and disseminatingo o
standards of good practice in the 
management of companies.
MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 
RESEARCH
  Most s. 6 disqualifications are of 
directors who are owner-managers of
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small businesses and who operate 
within what is essentially a self- 
employed culture. Unfortunately, 
disqualification tends to be least 
effective against this type of director 
since, once disqualified, they are 
generally able to find new work or to 
set up in business again in their own 
name. The impact of disqualification is 
much greater on career executives and 
professionally-qualified directors, for 
whom disqualification is a major threat 
to their reputation and professional or 
business status. The latter are more 
likely to respond to the potential threat 
of disqualification by adopting proper 
standards of practice. 
Due to the ease with which companies 
may be incorporated, and the fact that 
no qualification is required to act as a 
director, disqualifying a few thousand 
small company directors constitutes a 
limited control on the numbers of the 
potentially unfit who are able to enjoy 
the privilege of trading with limited 
liability.
While disqualification is aimed at those 
who set up companies and abuse the 
privilege of limited liability, 
disqualification of large numbers of 
small company directors has a limited 
benefit. In reviewing its achievements 
the Insolvency Service should be given 
more credit for disqualifications of 
directors of larger companies. Their 
unfit conduct • has the potential to 
cause the greatest damage within the 
commercial world and their 
disqualification is likely to have the 
greater regulatory benefit. Further, the 
legislation needs to be reformed so as 
to allow longer, even indefinite, 
periods of disqualification in 
appropriate cases. Overall, the 
emphasis should be on quality and 
length and not merely on the number 
of disqualifications achieved. Crude 
numbers of disqualification orders are 
not a reliable measure of effectiveness. 
For example about 10 per cent of 
those disqualified are already 
disqualified by reason of bankruptcy. 
Increasingly the numbers of 
disqualification orders include inactive 
directors/spouses and others who have 
no intention of setting up companies 
and so do not present a risk to the 
public.
The overall effectiveness of 
disqualification is limited. Given a 
current population of perhaps 3m 
directors, with millions more who
could easily buy a shelf company and 
become directors, the direct protective 
benefit of one or two thousand short- 
term disqualifications annually is 
relatively small. The deterrent effect of 
disqualification is also weak, although, 
as has already been said, it is more 
effective in relation to the more 
'professional' executive. The threat of 
disqualification is also relatively 
ineffective in encouraging directors to 
act properly towards their company's 
creditors, because disqualification is 
not seen as a significant sanction ando
because of the absence of any clear and 
authoritative statement of the 
principles which have been developed 
by the courts with regard to directors' 
duties to creditors.
When companies fail or are struck off, 
the level of investigation of their 
directors' past conduct varies. If the 
directors have succeeded in dissipating 
all the assets of the company, creditors 
will have no reason to initiate a formal 
winding-up, and so there will be no
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investigation at all. Whether in a 
liquidation an in-depth investigation 
takes place usually depends on the 
availability to the liquidator of 
sufficient assets within the company or 
of pro-active creditors who are willing 
to provide funding for proper 
investigative work to be done. Further, 
as an alternative to liquidation, 
directors can now apply for their 
company to be struck off the register, 
thereby avoiding any investigation ofJ o J o
their conduct. This procedure should 
be reviewed in order to assess whether 
it is being used to the detriment of 
creditors.
A disqualified director who takes part 
in the management of a company, in 
breach of the terms of the order, 
commits a criminal offence and is 
liable to prosecution. Unfortunately, 
infringements of this kind are difficult
O
to detect, and this constitutes an 
intrinsic limitation on the effectiveness 
of disqualification. In recent years, 
while huge efforts have gone into 
achieving disqualifications, there have 
been only a handful of prosecutions for 
acting as a director in breach of a 
disqualification order. Recent publicity 
for disqualification orders on the 
Companies House website, and the 
introduction of a disqualified directors 
'hotline', on which members of the 
public can report those they believe to 
be acting in breach of a disqualification
order should be of value in detectingo
breaches. Disqualifications nonetheless 
remain difficult and expensive to 
enforce.
While Companies House routinely 
checks the names of current directors 
against its separate register of 
disqualifications, there is no such 
check against the names of those who 
have been made bankrupt. Yet being 
an undischarged bankrupt is sufficient 
to disqualify a person from being a 
director or from taking part in the 
management of a company. There are 
currently perhaps 80,000 undischarged 
bankrupts who may thus avoid 
apprehension if their names are 
notified to Companies House as being 
company directors.
The results of the questionnaire 
surveys of disqualified directors and 
insolvency practitioners tends to 
confirm suspicions of the existence of 
a relatively high level of infringement 
of s. 6 disqualification orders and also 
of the perceived low risk of offenders 
being apprehended. This suggests that 
the achievement of ever-highero
numbers of disqualifications may not 
achieve the sterilisation of rogue 




The full report of the author's 
research findings is contained in 
Director Disqualification; No Hiding Place 
for the Unfit?, Research Report No. 59, 
Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, available from ACCA 
Sales, PO Box 66, Glasgow, G41 IBS; 
Publications@acca.org.uk.
AREAS FOR FURTHER 
REFORM
The above findings suggest the needo oo
for reforms in the following areas.
Involvement of the insolvency 
practitioner
While imposing a statutory duty on 
insolvency practitioners ('IPs') to report 
to the Disqualification Unit of the DTI 
any directors of a failed company who 
they believe to be 'unfit' has, in general, 
been a successful innovation, achieving 
consistency in the standards by which 
they report is difficult. IPs seem to be 
unclear that they must identify a prima 23
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facie legal case for unfitness in order to 
be obliged to report an individual 
director as unfit. Under the present law 
IPs should not report as unfit where they 
identify matters for determining unfit 
conduct but where in their opinion these 
are not sufficient to amount to a prima 
facie case for disqualification. However, 
expecting consistent decisions by IPs in 
cases where, despite instances of unfit 
conduct by a director it would not be 
prima facie in the public interest to 
disqualify, is unrealistic and 
impracticable. The law should therefore 
be reformed so as to require IPs to report 
whenever they identify any matter which 
is significant for determining unfitness, 
even though this may increase the 
number of reports submitted to the 
Disqualification Unit. The unit, with its 
trained and dedicated staff, is best placed 
to assess instances of unfit conduct on a 
consistent basis, using any other 
information available to them, and 
consequently, to decide whether in the 
public interest there exists a prima facie 
case of unfitness that justifies an 
application being made to the court.
Partial or conditional 
disqualification orders
At present, the act empowers the court 
to make a standard disqualification order, 
the effect of which is to exclude an 
individual from any direct or indirect 
involvement in the management of anvO J
company. Only on an application by a 
disqualified director for leave to take part 
in the management of a company does 
the court have any discretion to allow a 
limited or supervised role in 
management. Leave applications are rare 
and expensive. Consideration should 
therefore be given to empowering courts 
to make a wider range of partial or 
conditional disqualification orders that 
do not demand a complete withdrawal 
from management but allow some 
specified and conditional involvement in 
corporate management. For example, a 
director of a public company which fails 
might be disqualified from management
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of public companies but be thought fit to 
run his/her own private company.
Mandatory disqualification
The mandatory requirement to 
disqualify for at least two years a director 
whose past conduct was unfit has the 
result that the courts have no option but
to disqualify-, regardless of the director's 
current suitability to be involved in the 
management of a company and regardless 
of whether his disqualification is still in 
the public interest. This mandatory 
minimum disqualification is inflexible 
and should be reconsidered to enable 
judges to disqualify solely where the 
protection of a disqualification order is 
necessary in the public interest.
A director disqualification tribunal?
For many reasons, the courts are not 
best adapted to determining the fitness of 
individuals to take part in the 
management of companies. 
Disqualification trials have become a 
costly and artificial exercise which 
determine not whether the person is 
currently unfit but whether they 
infringed the required technical 
standards at some point in the past. 
Further, public resources and the 
expertise of the DTI are arrayed against 
the individual, who often feels that access 
to justice is being denied him. To remedy 
these failings, a Director Disqualification 
Tribunal is needed to hear all applications 
for disqualification on the ground of 
unfitness. This tribunal should also hear 
applications for leave to take part in 
management by those disqualified on all 
grounds under the act, including 
bankruptcy. With proceedings more 
informal than those of the courts, a 
tribunal would have many advantages. It 
would offer a fairer trial and better access 
to justice. It would be better able 
consistently to promote the policy 
behind the legislation. It would relieve 
the courts of the burden of 
disqualification cases, should be more 
able to minimise delay and would reduce 
costs for all concerned. The human rightsO
implications of achieving a fairer and 
swifter hearing are obvious.
A code for creditors
The standards of unfitness laid down in 
Sch. 1 to the act, and in a mass of case 
law, are complex, obscure and 
inaccessible to directors. A directors' 
Code for Creditors should, therefore, be 
drawn up as a means of improving the 
capacity' of the legislation to promote 
best practice in the conduct of directors 
towards creditors. Pulling together the 
principles found in the legislation and 
developed through case law, the courts, 
when deciding whether an individual
director is unfit, would be required to 
judge the director's conduct against this 
code. The code, which would be supplied 
to all directors by Companies House, 
would answer the criticism that there is 
at present no accessible statement of best 
or required practice to assist the well- 
intentioned director facing insolvency. 
The dissemination of the code would also 
enhance the moral justification of a 
disqualification where its contents are 
clearly infringed.
Disqualification by 'agreement'
Any call for automatic disqualification 
on corporate insolvency, or for 
disqualification by administrative means 
and not by an independent court or 
tribunal, should be resisted. The current 
proposal that legislation should be 
introduced to allow disqualifications to 
be made without a court hearing where 
the respondent so 'agrees', is not 
desirable. The burden on the individual 
of resisting an application by the DTI is 
so great that in most cases consent to a 
disqualification could hardly be refused. 
Such a process could therefore be 
oppressive and deny a fair hearing in 
breach of the director's human rights. It 
could also appear to be anti-enterprise 
and to increase the fear of failure. The 
better, swifter and more accessible 
alternative is, as suggested, to relieve the 
courts of the pressure of disqualification 
cases by introducing a Director 
Disqualification Tribunal.
OTHER WAYS TO PROMOTE 
GOOD CONDUCT
There are a number of alternative 
approaches which could be considered.
Disqualification of the convicted
When compared to the level of 
attention which has been given to 
disqualification on the ground of 
unfitness, the provision for 
disqualification under s. 2 of the Act   
where a director has been convicted of a 
criminal offence in connection with the 
management of a company   has had a 
relatively low profile. Criminal conduct 
will often be a substantial justification for 
disqualification and more attention needs 
to be given to sentencing policy in this 
area in order to maximise the section's 
effectiveness. Other reforms which 
should be considered include permitting
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disqualification where the offence 
committed was other than in connection 
with the management of a company, 
where a conviction occurred outside the 
UK and where an offence has been 
committed but has not led to a 
conviction.
Penalising the unfit director
While provision in the law for unfit 
directors to be disqualified remains 
desirable, there may be other and more 
cost-effective ways of deterring 
misconduct and establishing best 
practice. In this connection the criminal 
law should be reviewed to ensure that it 
can properly achieve the punitive 
function that disqualification is 
sometimes seen as performing. New 
strict liability offences and civil penalties 
which penalise the misuse of corporate 
property to the detriment of creditors 
could be highly effective. Proof of intent 
or dishonesty should not be required. 
Even if requiring a higher burden of 
proof, it may thus be easier to prove a 
limited set of facts to show an 
infringement than the broad and 
uncertain test of personal unfitness in 
order to disqualify. Care has to be taken, 
however, not to discourage valido
enterprise and risk-taking and to ensure 
that business failure is not unfairly 
stigmatised.
Compensating creditors
Provision already exists in the law, in 
certain limited circumstances, for errant 
directors to be required to compensate 
creditors for the losses they suffer. 
Compensation can have not only a 
deterrent but also a formative effect. It 
can also provide some redress for the loss 
suffered. Yet, despite trading at risk to 
creditors being the most common default 
alleged against unfit directors, none of
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the disqualified directors who answered 
the questionnaire issued for the purpose 
of this study had had a wrongful trading 
or other claim made against them. The 
laws and procedures enabling 
compensation to be recovered from 
directors need, therefore, to be reviewed. 
Possible avenues for reform include 
allowing disqualification orders to be 
accompanied by a compensation order 
and enabling the Insolvency Service to 
provide resources in some way for the 
pursuit of wrongful trading or other 
compensation claims.
Moderating the use and abuse of 
limited liability
Lastly, disqualification for the abuse of 
limited liability' raises questions as to the 
economic purpose of limited liability and 
whether the unquestioned policy of 
making private limited companies freely 
available as the onlv off-the-peg vehicle
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for small businesses is desirable. The ease 
with which limited companies may be 
incorporated, and the sustained legislative 
efforts to deregulate the small company 
sector, have made the privilege and 
protection of limited liability' accessible to 
huge numbers of small businesses, many 
of whose directors are either not able or 
not prepared to assume the consequential 
responsibilities to creditors. If there were 
fewer such businesses trading as limitedo
companies, the incidence of abuse of 
limited liability' should fall 
proportionately. Given that there should 
be no substantial impediments to 
incorporating with limited liability, what 
policies could be adopted? A compulsory 
minimum capital for private companies 
would be a modest 'entry fee' which 
would give entrepreneurs pause for 
thought before setting up a limited 
company. The development of a new 
unlimited corporate vehicle (such as an 
incorporated partnership or 'business 
corporation', as proposed by this author 
in Amicus Curiae, Issue 5, March 1998, 
p. 8) would also help to reduce the 
number of new small limited company 
registrations. The small business sector 
would then have a clear choice between, 
on the one hand, a simple, unlimited 
corporate form for whose debts the 
proprietors would be liable or, on the 
other hand, the limited company, along 
with a higher level of regulation and legal 
responsibilities to creditors. If the range 
of business vehicles were increased, the 
process of disqualifying directors would 
become more credible and justifiable. 
While a disqualification would withdraw 
from the abuser of limited liability the 
right to be involved in a limited company, 
it would not deprive that person of the 
legitimate opportunity to use a corporate 
business structure which did not confer 
limited liability.
CONCLUSION
Disqualification is a costly process for 
all concerned. When a director targeted 
for disqualification is faced with the 
resources and expertise of the Insolvency 
Service, the process and its rhetoric may
be oppressive and may risk appearing 
anti-enterprise in spirit. At the point at 
which the increased numbers of 
disqualifications begins to have some 
effect, so also it may tend to instil in 
entrepreneurs a fear of failure. It is very 
difficult to assess the public benefit 
secured at such cost and, in manv 
respects, disqualification of unfit 
directors is relatively ineffectual. It is not, 
however, useless and, while the regime 
should be improved by means such as 
those put forward in this report, it 
should be retained.
It is unrealistic to suggest that for rogue 
directors there is 'no place to hide' and 
that the threat of disqualification can 
substantially protect creditors from such 
individuals. Disqualification should be 
seen as but one device in a regulatory 
armoury for protecting creditors and the 
public interest. There are many 
alternative approaches to the problem. It 
is important also to realise that, if the 
abuse of limited liability at the expense of 
creditors is recognised as a serious 
problem, its cause may in part be that too 
many small businesses have been seduced 
into incorporation by a policy of 
deregulation and for want of any viable 
alternative unlimited corporate form. It 
is at the very least suprising that anyone 
can form a limited company and become 
a director of it simply by paying a 
registration fee of £20, but, if things go 
wrong, tens of thousands of pounds of 
public money may then be spent on 
achieving a brief disqualification. The 
current crusade to disqualify unfit 
directors has some value but for the 
Insolvency Service, expending scarce 
public resources, there may simply be too 
many windmills at which to tilt. The 
strident and high-minded rhetoric of 
government ministers claiming that they 
will pursue rogue directors to extinction 
is properly intended to increase the 
deterrent effect of disqualification. 
However, it is a matter of concern if the 
government comes to believe its own 
rhetoric as to the effectiveness of 
disqualification. With the disqualification 
process currently under review by the 
minister, one fears that the intrinsic 
limitations on the effectiveness of 
disqualification will not be 
appreciated. ©
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